FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

TRIVIA: Over 10% of the world's Master CFI - Aerobatic instructors work at Aviation Performance Solutions (APS), the world's leading provider of Upset Prevention and Recovery Training. APS has more Master CFI–Aerobatic instructors than any other flight training provider.

Mesa, Arizona - 16 December 2011: Aviation Performance Solutions, LLC is very pleased to announce that Brian "Rotor" Willett has earned his Master CFI – Aerobatic accreditation.  A full time instructor with Aviation Performance Solutions, Rotor has over 30 years of aviation.  A former USAF Command Pilot and Flight Examiner (SEFE), Rotor is an ATP SEL & MEL, Comm Inst Rotorcraft-Helicopter, Comm SES, CFI/CFII Airplane and CFI/CFII Helicopter certified pilot with six type ratings. A DESERT STORM combat veteran with over 8,000 hours of global flight experience and 1,500 hours of inflight instruction in both civilian business jet and military operations, Rotor brings a wealth of experience to all of APS' programs.

To put this achievement in its proper perspective, there are approximately 96,000 CFIs in the United States.  Fewer than 700 of those aviation educators have achieved this professional distinction thus far.  The last 16 national Flight Instructors of the Year were Master CFIs (see: http://www.GeneralAviationAwards.org/)  while Rotor is one of only 25 Arizona teachers of flight to earn this prestigious "Master" title and one of only 26 nationwide to earn aerobatic accreditation.

In the words of former FAA Administrator Marion Blakey, "The Master Instructor accreditation singles out the best that the right seat has to offer."

The Master Instructor designation is a national accreditation recognized by the FAA.  Candidates must demonstrate an ongoing commitment to excellence, professional growth, and service to the aviation community, and must pass a rigorous evaluation by a peer Board of Review.  The process parallels the continuing education regimen used by other professionals to enhance their knowledge base while increasing their professionalism.  Designees are recognized as outstanding aviation educators for not only their excellence in teaching, but for their engagement in the continuous process of learning -- both their own, and their students'.  The designation must be renewed biennially and significantly surpasses the FAA requirements for renewal of the candidate's flight instructor certificate.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Faye Hamilton, Marketing Coordinator
Aviation Performance Solutions
Mobile: 480-797-0752
Office: 480-279-1881 ext. 12
www.apstraining.com

Pilot Project: Download this AeroSafety World article in PDF

At AeroSafety World: Link to Original Online ASW Version

Evolving guidelines aim to correct deficiencies in methods of training for airplane upset prevention and recovery.

By Paul “BJ” Ransbury and Janeen Kochan

Although debate continues about how best to incorporate upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) at the commercial pilot licensing and type rating levels for airline transport pilots (ASW, 6/11, p. 24), a robust high-level framework already exists. This framework enables a consistent delivery of instruction, general sequencing of training phases and practical verification of effectiveness by integrating resources such as Web-based curricula, specialized UPRT instructors, aerobatic-capable airplanes and Level D simulators.

The framework also addresses seven deficiencies that we outline in this article to help mitigate the persistent, complex and lethal problem of loss of control in-flight (LOC-I). Loss of control can be a precursor to, or the result of, an airplane upset.

The airline industry’s Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2 defines airplane upset as “an airplane in flight unintentionally exceeding the parameters normally experienced in line operations or training: pitch attitude greater than 25 degrees nose up; pitch attitude greater than 10 degrees nose down; bank angle greater than 45 degrees; [or,] within the above parameters, but flying at airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions.”

The geometric pitch and bank components of the definition can be plotted as a blue region representing the normal flight environment (Figure 1). Disregarding airspeed in the definition for the moment, the vast majority of commercial pilots tend to spend more than 99 percent of their flying careers within these tight blue-region confines, which represent less than 5 percent of the all-attitude flight envelope. In rare instances during commercial pilot licensing training, and perhaps during unusual attitude training in the simulator, pilots delve into Figure 1’s yellow region, up to 30 degrees of pitch and 60 degrees of bank, which represents the widely accepted maximum pitch and bank limitations of commercial licensing training. This yellow region represents barely more than 11 percent of the all-attitude flight envelope.

Deficiency No. 1, Unfounded Confidence. One faulty assumption by pilots is that their day-in, day-out expertise in the blue region will give them the skills, discipline and awareness necessary to prevent or recover from an airplane upset event. An upset event that is rapidly hurtling out of the blue region, through the yellow region and into the last region we call the all-attitude red zone can present unexpected, unfamiliar and sometimes violent situations that can rapidly degrade a pilot’s ability to prevent the escalating LOC-I condition or to effectively recover.

What does the reference to inappropriate airspeeds in the upset definition mean exactly? Similar to plotting data that represent the pitch-bank environment, we can graphically represent on the coefficient of lift curve a plot where pilots are only regularly exposed to certain portions of the speed envelope (Figure 2). With effects of aerodynamic loading aside, the typical 1-g experience of pilots (that is, one times standard gravitational acceleration) is shown by the green region of the curve proceeding from the bottom of the chart up to the L/D max angle-of-attack (AOA), the lowest point on the total drag curve.

This region of speed stability is where pilots spend almost their entire flying career. Pilots are only rarely exposed to the yellow region of the curve that proceeds up from L/D max AOA to the stall warning AOA. In speed terms, in a 1-g flight condition, the stall warning AOA is usually 5 kt to 10 kt faster than the published 1-g stall speed. The yellow region is generally only experienced intentionally by commercial pilots when practicing stall prevention training by initiating recovery at the first indication of the stall.

Up to this point in the speed/AOA discussion, pilots have a measured capability to operate in these areas. Unfortunately, most pilots’ ability to deal with events further on the curve is noticeably deficient. Nearly 50 percent of fatal LOC-I accidents are due to the aerodynamic stall. That means that pilots, for a variety of reasons, do not always effectively remain below the stall warning AOA/airspeed.

Historically, in stall prevention training at the commercial level, pilots have been repeatedly taught to minimize altitude loss, and this has been a criterion of performance evaluation (ASW, 11/10, p. 40). This precept is valid until pilots are faced with an actual stall, when they have maneuvered the airplane beyond the yellow region, through the orange region and into the airspeed/AOA red zone of the coefficient of lift curve.

Once at the stall, a pilot often reverts to what was taught in training: To recover with a minimum loss of altitude. This is the exact opposite of what should be emphasized: To reduce the AOA first and foremost. The aerodynamic stall is an airplane upset by definition, and these pilot errors perpetuate stalls, which can lead to serious airplane upsets.

Deficiency No. 2: Improper Stall Recovery. The obsolete paradigm of minimizing altitude loss has generated situations in which pilots continued to pull back on the control column, further increasing AOA in the stall and immersing themselves in the red zone. Several major challenges are presented here to these pilots. These challenges may never have been experienced, and pilots have not been consistently trained on how to exit from this deadly region. Other than rare exposures to the peak of the lift curve during initial flight training, this red zone is not often visited.

The risk of a fatal accident increases in proportion to duration and depth of exposure to the red zones. Myriad warning cues — the auditory, visual, tactile control feedback, motion cueing and other combinations of sensory feedback — also flood the pilot’s senses, causing extremes of psychological states such as stress and panic and of physiological states such as spatial disorientation. Adding insult to injury, piloting skills suitable for the blue and green regions of Figures 1 and 2 rapidly decrease in their effectiveness during the escalating upset event. Counter-intuitive, corrective control inputs are often required to reliably recover the airplane to the “normal flight” regions of the commercial licensing flight envelope. Without proper UPRT, it is doubtful the pilot will recover.

If these red zones are not being addressed adequately by traditional training, where do we start as an aviation industry to significantly mitigate LOC-I? Mitigation begins with ensuring that industry-approved UPRT programs establish a sound foundation from which situational awareness, insight, knowledge, and eventually, skills can be reliably developed in the all-attitude, all-envelope environment.

Industry-approved, Web-based training tools can assist as powerful academic resources. At the outset, however, it must be emphasized that LOC-I mitigation is not an academics-only challenge. Academic preparation offers limited mitigation as a standalone intervention. Yet, academics combined with practical, hands-on experience under a quality-assured program can have significant and lasting UPRT skill-development benefits.

A pilot’s unfamiliarity with the all-attitude, all-envelope environment can be overcome efficiently by imparting a significant portion of the awareness skills early in initial UPRT sessions. These initial sessions are best accomplished in an aerobatic-capable airplane with expert UPRT instructors, preferably before beginning airline flying.

UPRT instructors must cautiously build from the familiar to the unfamiliar to effectively bridge knowledge and experience gaps. Extensive experience shows that early focus on awareness of AOA, load, lift vector, coordination and energy management, combined with real-time feedback on the negative consequences of their mismanagement of those elements, helps trainees to gain trust and confidence in the training platform, the instructor pilot, and the building-block design of the course of UPRT training.

Teaching the fundamental concepts and core skills in a progressive, non-threatening manner enhances the trainee’s situational awareness at a rate that allows knowledge, skills and abilities to be internalized — enhancing long-term retention. When effectively delivered, this initial UPRT indoctrination comprehensively prepares the pilot for type-specific UPRT differences training ideally provided by the airline in the simulator.

The focus of UPRT must be placed squarely and firmly on upset prevention through enhanced pilot awareness. Two general types of this training can be clearly defined. One type stresses time-favorable actions through effective aeronautical decision making (ADM), and the other type stresses time-critical actions to counter an escalating upset before it develops beyond certain thresholds. UPRT must address both of these prevention concepts. Time-favorable ADM upset prevention, typically on the order of several minutes or even hours, involves environmental analysis, upset risk awareness, resource management and breaking the error chain through sound judgment.

Deficiency No. 3: Pilot Over-reaction. As the time frame for stall/upset response compresses, typically onto the scale of seconds or fractions of a second, the pilot’s challenges become quite different from time-favorable ADM. When startled by a rapid-onset upset event, implementing the correct, time-sensitive control inputs to counter the escalating condition is often the most difficult aspect of prevention in UPRT. For the psychological and physiological reasons noted, pilots faced with rapid-onset airplane upset events tend to over-react to situations without dedicated training. Pilots in real upsets have been observed making the situation worse, sometimes unrecoverable, or causing airplane structural failure in rare instances. Over-reaction must be addressed, and this is another critical LOC-I mitigation from UPRT.

Once an airplane’s flight condition unintentionally exceeds a certain level of severity, the pilot must recognize the necessity of intervention. As the situation transitions from the prevention phase to the recovery phase defined by the above airplane upset parameters — or the prevention phase seemingly has been skipped entirely — the pilot must take immediate corrective action.

Deficiency No. 4: Primary/Exclusive Recovery Focus. Many training providers treat the upset recovery phase as the primary, or exclusive, focus of their version of UPRT. To be clear, a comprehensively addressed recovery phase has tremendous value in enhancing the trainee’s ability to contain real-world startle factor; to properly use the primary controls of all-attitude, all-envelope flight; and to enhance situational awareness of the event. Nevertheless, the core element of UPRT must be upset prevention with the understanding that this can be significantly augmented by integrating thorough and comprehensive recovery training.

The building-block sequence necessary in imparting UPRT recovery-phase skills comprises the development of primary control strategies, alternate control strategies, secondary flight control integration, airplane type/class–specific considerations and UPRT-specific crew resource management (CRM).

Deficiency No. 5, Absence of Startle Factor. Some UPRT programs fail to adequately address the startle factor. Imparting UPRT skill sets to trainees without startle training does not reliably enable them to recover during the mentally and physically demanding challenge of an actual airplane upset. However, training providers must be extra cautious in how unannounced events are integrated into UPRT. Inappropriately subjecting trainees to dramatic in-flight or simulated events — those beyond their skill level to resolve correctly — can have long-term negative consequences in UPRT skill development.

Deficiency No. 6, Simulator Limitations. Presently, the required magnitude, quality and relevance of startle factor training for UPRT cannot be fully accomplished exclusively through ground-based simulation. Appropriate UPRT training in all-attitude, aerobatic-capable airplanes readily immerses the trainee in dynamic surprise/startle experiences that are recognized in scientific research as unique and necessary.

Deficiency No. 7, Problematic CRM. Ensuring that CRM optimizes a flight crew’s upset response has been particularly challenging to the global community of UPRT specialists — for example, the concerns if only one flight crewmember has completed UPRT.

The presence of an untrained crewmember in this same crew arguably could have dire consequences in an upset event due to flight control interference. In LOC-I scenarios, the flight crew must immediately communicate and confirm the situation; manage the automation and transfer control (if necessary) to the pilot with the most situational awareness; work together through standardized interactions to mutually enhance awareness of the dynamic flight condition; and apply correct, timely control manipulation.

Paul “BJ” Ransbury, president and chief flight instructor (CFI) of APS Emergency Maneuver Training, and three-time recipient of the master CFI–aerobatic designation from the aviation education industry’s Master Instructor Program, is a founder and vice president–global integration of the Upset Prevention and Recovery Training Association <uprta.org>, a former Airbus A320 airline pilot and a former F/A-18 fighter pilot and tactics instructor. He also is co-leader of the upset analysis and development team of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE). Janeen Kochan, Ph.D., is a human factors scientist, designated pilot examiner and instructor pilot at Aviation Research, Training and Services; a former airline captain; and an author of research reports on pilot training for the mitigation of startle/surprise effects. She is also a member of ICATEE. Their original paper is available at <apstraining.com/uprt-deficits>.

Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board

The video below shows the recorded opening remarks to the Royal Aeronautical Society's Flight Simulation Group meeting on 9 November 2011 in London, UK. The NTSB chairman encourages the enhancement of flight simulator technology and the prioritization of mitigating the loss of control in-flight threat in aviation safety developments.

This video is presented using the inter-browser compatible HTML5 format. Unless you've changed your browser setting manually, the most recent version of IE 9.0+, Firefox 3.5+, Safari 3.0+, Chrome 3.0+, Opera 10.5+, iPhone 1.0+ and Android 2.0+ will play the video. Note - APS videos are in high resolution so loading times will vary based on your connection speed.

Dr. Sunjoo Advani, Chairman of the Royal Aeronautical Society's ICATEE (International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes), provides a very interesting and informative presentation addressing industry challenges, solutions and expected progressions in loss of control in-flight mitigation through enhanced Airplane Upset Prevention and Recovery Training for the aviation industry.
 

 

This video is presented using the inter-browser compatible HTML5 format. Unless you've changed your browser setting manually, the most recent version of IE 9.0+, Firefox 3.5+, Safari 3.0+, Chrome 3.0+, Opera 10.5+, iPhone 1.0+ and Android 2.0+ will play the video. Note - APS videos are in high resolution so loading times will vary based on your connection speed.

I head up a Fortune 25 corporate flight department. We are fortunate to have highly experienced, professional flight crews in the cockpits of our aircraft. Most of us would probably rate ourselves as "above-average" pilots and able to handle just about anything thrown our way.

However what I realized after taking the upset recovery training at APS is despite all of our years of flying, recurrent training and such, we really have been woefully unprepared to handle a true upset recovery. I started the program as a true beginner in upset recovery and left, perhaps not a master, but certainly a far more capable and better educated pilot.

I look forward to continuing to hone my skills at subsequent APS training events. Thanks for doing such a great job and I look forward to many more years of training with you.

The following 50-minute presentation was recorded live On Saturday, June 11, 2011, at the Pilatus Owners and Pilots Association annual gathering in Denver, Colorado ...

Summarizing 2 years of focused industry effort on systematically identifying and addressing the Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) problem, the Royal Aeronautical Society's International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE), as well as the international non-profit Upset Prevention & Recovery Training Association (UPRTA), presents a 50-minute industry update on recent advancements in commercial aviation upset recovery training efforts. A report issued by Boeing in July 2010, and a 2011 general aviation report issued by the GAJSC, identify Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) as the cause of the most crash-related fatalities in both commercial aviation worldwide and US general aviation over the past 10 Years.

Turn Up the Volume and Click Play on the Image / Video Below to Review

**

Review a Testimonial by a PC-12 Pilot graduating from the
APS Professional Jet Pilot Upset Recovery Training Program

Speaker:
Paul BJ Ransbury
UPRTA - Vice President, Global Integration
ICATEE - Co-Leader, Upset Training Analysis Team
APS Emergency Maneuver Training - President

• Under Mr. Ransbury's direct management and supervision of both US-based and foreign academies, more than 4,000 professional jet pilots have been successfully trained in standardized upset prevention & recovery training techniques and mitigation strategies
• Former F/A-18 Hornet Fighter Pilot and Instructor
• Former Airbus A320 Airline Pilot
• Gold Seal Flight Instructor / Master CFI - Aerobatic
  CFI / CFII / MEI / AGI

The following accident analysis information was presented in the June 2011 Issue of Sport Aviation magazine ...

10-Years of Accidents and Causal Factors

THE GENERAL AVIATION JOINT STEERING COMMITTEE (GAJSC) and Safety Analysis Team (SAT) continues to focus on data-driven risks and solutions. To begin that process, the fatal GA accident range of 2001—2010 was selected for analysis, resulting in 2,472 total events. Accidents were categorized using the common codes such as loss of control—in-flight (LOC—I), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), system/component failure—powerplant (SCF—PP), etc. Additionally, the type of aircraft was also categorized, using homebuilt, turbine, and reciprocating non-homebuilt, resulting in the chart seen here.

Loss of control (LOC) was identified far and away as the most prevalent type of fatal GA accident with 1,190 fatal accidents followed by controlled flight into terrain, with 432. A risk reduction working group has been formed that will study LOC accidents, beginning with those occurring during the approach and landing phase of flight, determine contributing factors, and develop intervention strategies. EAA staff is actively participating in the GAJSC, SAT, and a newly established working group in our continuing efforts to reduce the fatal accident rate.

Sport Aviation, June 2011 (www.eaa.org), Page 9

Excerpt from AF447 Update Report:

"The airplane’s angle of attack increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs. The vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, dropped to 700 ft/min and the roll varied between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The speed displayed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees ... "

For official information, download the 27 May 2011 update report titled ACCIDENT TO THE AIRBUS A330-203 FLIGHT AF 447 ON 1ST JUNE 2009

NEW FINDINGS

At this stage of the investigation, as an addition to the BEA interim reports of 2 July and 17 December 2009, the following new facts have been established:

• The composition of the crew was in accordance with the operator’s procedures.
• At the time of the event, the weight and balance of the airplane were within the operational limits.
• At the time of the event, the two co-pilots were seated in the cockpit and the Captain was resting. The latter returned to the cockpit about 1 min 30 after the disengagement of the autopilot.
• There was an inconsistency between the speeds displayed on the left side and the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS). This lasted for less than one minute.
• After the autopilot disengagement:
  • the airplane climbed to 38,000 ft,
  • the stall warning was triggered and the airplane stalled,
  • the inputs made by the PF were mainly nose-up,
  • the descent lasted 3 min 30, during which the airplane remained stalled. The angle of attack increased and remained above 35 degrees,
  • the engines were operating and always responded to crew commands.
  • The last recorded values were a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, a roll angle of 5.3 degrees left and a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.

The following presentation was recorded live On Wednesday, April 20, 2011, at the NBAA Corporate Aviation Safety Seminar (CASS) in San Diego, California ...

Summarizing 2 years of focused industry effort on systematically identifying and addressing the Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) problem, the Royal Aeronautical Society's International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE), as well as the international non-profit Upset Prevention & Recovery Training Association (UPRTA), will be presenting a short independent 30-minute industry update on recent advancements in commercial aviation upset recovery training efforts. A report issued by Boeing in July 2010 identifies Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) as the cause of the most crash-related fatalities in commercial aviation worldwide over the past 10 Years.

Turn Up the Volume and Click Play on the Image / Video Below to Review

**

Speaker:
Paul BJ Ransbury
UPRTA - Vice President, Global Integration
ICATEE - Co-Leader, Upset Training Matrix Development Team
APS Emergency Maneuver Training - President

• Under Mr. Ransbury's direct management and supervision of both US-based and foreign academies, more than 4,000 professional jet pilots have been successfully trained in standardized upset prevention & recovery training techniques and mitigation strategies
• Former F/A-18 Hornet Fighter Pilot and Instructor
• Former Airbus A320 Airline Pilot
• Gold Seal Flight Instructor / Master CFI - Aerobatic
  CFI / CFII / MEI / AGI