Pilot Project: Download this AeroSafety World article in PDF

At AeroSafety World: Link to Original Online ASW Version

Evolving guidelines aim to correct deficiencies in methods of training for airplane upset prevention and recovery.

By Paul “BJ” Ransbury and Janeen Kochan

Although debate continues about how best to incorporate upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) at the commercial pilot licensing and type rating levels for airline transport pilots (ASW, 6/11, p. 24), a robust high-level framework already exists. This framework enables a consistent delivery of instruction, general sequencing of training phases and practical verification of effectiveness by integrating resources such as Web-based curricula, specialized UPRT instructors, aerobatic-capable airplanes and Level D simulators.

The framework also addresses seven deficiencies that we outline in this article to help mitigate the persistent, complex and lethal problem of loss of control in-flight (LOC-I). Loss of control can be a precursor to, or the result of, an airplane upset.

The airline industry’s Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2 defines airplane upset as “an airplane in flight unintentionally exceeding the parameters normally experienced in line operations or training: pitch attitude greater than 25 degrees nose up; pitch attitude greater than 10 degrees nose down; bank angle greater than 45 degrees; [or,] within the above parameters, but flying at airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions.”

The geometric pitch and bank components of the definition can be plotted as a blue region representing the normal flight environment (Figure 1). Disregarding airspeed in the definition for the moment, the vast majority of commercial pilots tend to spend more than 99 percent of their flying careers within these tight blue-region confines, which represent less than 5 percent of the all-attitude flight envelope. In rare instances during commercial pilot licensing training, and perhaps during unusual attitude training in the simulator, pilots delve into Figure 1’s yellow region, up to 30 degrees of pitch and 60 degrees of bank, which represents the widely accepted maximum pitch and bank limitations of commercial licensing training. This yellow region represents barely more than 11 percent of the all-attitude flight envelope.

Deficiency No. 1, Unfounded Confidence. One faulty assumption by pilots is that their day-in, day-out expertise in the blue region will give them the skills, discipline and awareness necessary to prevent or recover from an airplane upset event. An upset event that is rapidly hurtling out of the blue region, through the yellow region and into the last region we call the all-attitude red zone can present unexpected, unfamiliar and sometimes violent situations that can rapidly degrade a pilot’s ability to prevent the escalating LOC-I condition or to effectively recover.

What does the reference to inappropriate airspeeds in the upset definition mean exactly? Similar to plotting data that represent the pitch-bank environment, we can graphically represent on the coefficient of lift curve a plot where pilots are only regularly exposed to certain portions of the speed envelope (Figure 2). With effects of aerodynamic loading aside, the typical 1-g experience of pilots (that is, one times standard gravitational acceleration) is shown by the green region of the curve proceeding from the bottom of the chart up to the L/D max angle-of-attack (AOA), the lowest point on the total drag curve.

This region of speed stability is where pilots spend almost their entire flying career. Pilots are only rarely exposed to the yellow region of the curve that proceeds up from L/D max AOA to the stall warning AOA. In speed terms, in a 1-g flight condition, the stall warning AOA is usually 5 kt to 10 kt faster than the published 1-g stall speed. The yellow region is generally only experienced intentionally by commercial pilots when practicing stall prevention training by initiating recovery at the first indication of the stall.

Up to this point in the speed/AOA discussion, pilots have a measured capability to operate in these areas. Unfortunately, most pilots’ ability to deal with events further on the curve is noticeably deficient. Nearly 50 percent of fatal LOC-I accidents are due to the aerodynamic stall. That means that pilots, for a variety of reasons, do not always effectively remain below the stall warning AOA/airspeed.

Historically, in stall prevention training at the commercial level, pilots have been repeatedly taught to minimize altitude loss, and this has been a criterion of performance evaluation (ASW, 11/10, p. 40). This precept is valid until pilots are faced with an actual stall, when they have maneuvered the airplane beyond the yellow region, through the orange region and into the airspeed/AOA red zone of the coefficient of lift curve.

Once at the stall, a pilot often reverts to what was taught in training: To recover with a minimum loss of altitude. This is the exact opposite of what should be emphasized: To reduce the AOA first and foremost. The aerodynamic stall is an airplane upset by definition, and these pilot errors perpetuate stalls, which can lead to serious airplane upsets.

Deficiency No. 2: Improper Stall Recovery. The obsolete paradigm of minimizing altitude loss has generated situations in which pilots continued to pull back on the control column, further increasing AOA in the stall and immersing themselves in the red zone. Several major challenges are presented here to these pilots. These challenges may never have been experienced, and pilots have not been consistently trained on how to exit from this deadly region. Other than rare exposures to the peak of the lift curve during initial flight training, this red zone is not often visited.

The risk of a fatal accident increases in proportion to duration and depth of exposure to the red zones. Myriad warning cues — the auditory, visual, tactile control feedback, motion cueing and other combinations of sensory feedback — also flood the pilot’s senses, causing extremes of psychological states such as stress and panic and of physiological states such as spatial disorientation. Adding insult to injury, piloting skills suitable for the blue and green regions of Figures 1 and 2 rapidly decrease in their effectiveness during the escalating upset event. Counter-intuitive, corrective control inputs are often required to reliably recover the airplane to the “normal flight” regions of the commercial licensing flight envelope. Without proper UPRT, it is doubtful the pilot will recover.

If these red zones are not being addressed adequately by traditional training, where do we start as an aviation industry to significantly mitigate LOC-I? Mitigation begins with ensuring that industry-approved UPRT programs establish a sound foundation from which situational awareness, insight, knowledge, and eventually, skills can be reliably developed in the all-attitude, all-envelope environment.

Industry-approved, Web-based training tools can assist as powerful academic resources. At the outset, however, it must be emphasized that LOC-I mitigation is not an academics-only challenge. Academic preparation offers limited mitigation as a standalone intervention. Yet, academics combined with practical, hands-on experience under a quality-assured program can have significant and lasting UPRT skill-development benefits.

A pilot’s unfamiliarity with the all-attitude, all-envelope environment can be overcome efficiently by imparting a significant portion of the awareness skills early in initial UPRT sessions. These initial sessions are best accomplished in an aerobatic-capable airplane with expert UPRT instructors, preferably before beginning airline flying.

UPRT instructors must cautiously build from the familiar to the unfamiliar to effectively bridge knowledge and experience gaps. Extensive experience shows that early focus on awareness of AOA, load, lift vector, coordination and energy management, combined with real-time feedback on the negative consequences of their mismanagement of those elements, helps trainees to gain trust and confidence in the training platform, the instructor pilot, and the building-block design of the course of UPRT training.

Teaching the fundamental concepts and core skills in a progressive, non-threatening manner enhances the trainee’s situational awareness at a rate that allows knowledge, skills and abilities to be internalized — enhancing long-term retention. When effectively delivered, this initial UPRT indoctrination comprehensively prepares the pilot for type-specific UPRT differences training ideally provided by the airline in the simulator.

The focus of UPRT must be placed squarely and firmly on upset prevention through enhanced pilot awareness. Two general types of this training can be clearly defined. One type stresses time-favorable actions through effective aeronautical decision making (ADM), and the other type stresses time-critical actions to counter an escalating upset before it develops beyond certain thresholds. UPRT must address both of these prevention concepts. Time-favorable ADM upset prevention, typically on the order of several minutes or even hours, involves environmental analysis, upset risk awareness, resource management and breaking the error chain through sound judgment.

Deficiency No. 3: Pilot Over-reaction. As the time frame for stall/upset response compresses, typically onto the scale of seconds or fractions of a second, the pilot’s challenges become quite different from time-favorable ADM. When startled by a rapid-onset upset event, implementing the correct, time-sensitive control inputs to counter the escalating condition is often the most difficult aspect of prevention in UPRT. For the psychological and physiological reasons noted, pilots faced with rapid-onset airplane upset events tend to over-react to situations without dedicated training. Pilots in real upsets have been observed making the situation worse, sometimes unrecoverable, or causing airplane structural failure in rare instances. Over-reaction must be addressed, and this is another critical LOC-I mitigation from UPRT.

Once an airplane’s flight condition unintentionally exceeds a certain level of severity, the pilot must recognize the necessity of intervention. As the situation transitions from the prevention phase to the recovery phase defined by the above airplane upset parameters — or the prevention phase seemingly has been skipped entirely — the pilot must take immediate corrective action.

Deficiency No. 4: Primary/Exclusive Recovery Focus. Many training providers treat the upset recovery phase as the primary, or exclusive, focus of their version of UPRT. To be clear, a comprehensively addressed recovery phase has tremendous value in enhancing the trainee’s ability to contain real-world startle factor; to properly use the primary controls of all-attitude, all-envelope flight; and to enhance situational awareness of the event. Nevertheless, the core element of UPRT must be upset prevention with the understanding that this can be significantly augmented by integrating thorough and comprehensive recovery training.

The building-block sequence necessary in imparting UPRT recovery-phase skills comprises the development of primary control strategies, alternate control strategies, secondary flight control integration, airplane type/class–specific considerations and UPRT-specific crew resource management (CRM).

Deficiency No. 5, Absence of Startle Factor. Some UPRT programs fail to adequately address the startle factor. Imparting UPRT skill sets to trainees without startle training does not reliably enable them to recover during the mentally and physically demanding challenge of an actual airplane upset. However, training providers must be extra cautious in how unannounced events are integrated into UPRT. Inappropriately subjecting trainees to dramatic in-flight or simulated events — those beyond their skill level to resolve correctly — can have long-term negative consequences in UPRT skill development.

Deficiency No. 6, Simulator Limitations. Presently, the required magnitude, quality and relevance of startle factor training for UPRT cannot be fully accomplished exclusively through ground-based simulation. Appropriate UPRT training in all-attitude, aerobatic-capable airplanes readily immerses the trainee in dynamic surprise/startle experiences that are recognized in scientific research as unique and necessary.

Deficiency No. 7, Problematic CRM. Ensuring that CRM optimizes a flight crew’s upset response has been particularly challenging to the global community of UPRT specialists — for example, the concerns if only one flight crewmember has completed UPRT.

The presence of an untrained crewmember in this same crew arguably could have dire consequences in an upset event due to flight control interference. In LOC-I scenarios, the flight crew must immediately communicate and confirm the situation; manage the automation and transfer control (if necessary) to the pilot with the most situational awareness; work together through standardized interactions to mutually enhance awareness of the dynamic flight condition; and apply correct, timely control manipulation.

Paul “BJ” Ransbury, president and chief flight instructor (CFI) of APS Emergency Maneuver Training, and three-time recipient of the master CFI–aerobatic designation from the aviation education industry’s Master Instructor Program, is a founder and vice president–global integration of the Upset Prevention and Recovery Training Association <uprta.org>, a former Airbus A320 airline pilot and a former F/A-18 fighter pilot and tactics instructor. He also is co-leader of the upset analysis and development team of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE). Janeen Kochan, Ph.D., is a human factors scientist, designated pilot examiner and instructor pilot at Aviation Research, Training and Services; a former airline captain; and an author of research reports on pilot training for the mitigation of startle/surprise effects. She is also a member of ICATEE. Their original paper is available at <apstraining.com/uprt-deficits>.

The Spiral Dive Question ...

In a Spiral Dive, I've heard it said a pilot should reduce g-loading prior to rolling in an 'over bank'. Does 'over bank' mean more than 90 degrees banked or does it include say 60-90 degrees of banking? The reason for the question is related to the Push-Power-Roll mantra ... does it really apply in a spiral dive where the bank angle is less than 90 degrees? The Spiral Dive is a bank problem so shouldn't it be primarily a roll with aileron and rudder to fix it, not 'pushing' first?

(Paraphrased from a comment left on the APS website by 'Kriegler')

Response on Unloading in a Spiral Dive

* The following response has been transferred from the APS online forum. Please leave your comments at the bottom of the page and please include your name and email address.

Hi Kriegler - Thank you for your question (for the purposes of this distribution, the APS Director of Flight Training & Standards has included a short video on the Spiral Dive below).

The Primary Control Strategy you are referring to ('Push-Power-Roll mantra' - we don't call it a 'Mantra' as that is not technically its intent) is an upset recovery strategy. By saying 'upset recovery strategy' I mean it is a series of control applications necessary in a given flight condition (that has exceeded some predefined set of parameters that cue a pilot that an atypical control intervention is likely necessary) to mitigate the situation. The specifics of those parameters signaling the need for an intervention recovery strategy vary with the airplane's limit load, pilot experience level and even the specifics of the flight condition (such as speed, pitch attitude, configuration and available altitude above ground). In the example of the spiral dive you mention it implies the airplane has exceeded it's critical bank angle and the pilot is near, at or even beyond the limit load of the airplane through the use of traditional elevator management by load variation in an unsuccessful attempt to arrest the continuing altitude loss by indiscriminately 'pulling' on the control column. Pulling even harder, in an attempt to bring the nose up, often has little positive benefit in relation the desired outcome of 'Recovery'.

Briefly, before getting into a few details, 'yes' the primary issue faced in a spiral dive is a lift-vector orientation problem. This primary issue ultimately needs to be mitigated by rolling the airplane to a wings level flight attitude. However, just because it is primarily a rolling (or lift-vector pointing) issue it does not mean the lowest risk and most effective method of re-orienting the lift vector starts with the roll itself although it is clearly urgent to get to it as soon as practicable. Let's outline a few assumptions to be able to better clarify the meaning of that sentence ...

Assumptions and General Concepts

Let's assume the pilot has just passed critical bank in a Spiral Dive at a speed above maneuvering speed at the limit load of his/her airplane. The Critical Bank Angle is the bank angle, when above maneuvering speed (Va), where a limit load sustained pull is required to just maintain level flight. A good question would be 'What is the critical bank angle of my airplane?'. The answer is 'It depends'. Generally speaking, the Critical Bank Angle of a 3.8G-limited light normal category airplane is about 73 degrees at airspeeds above Va. However, the critical bank angle of a 2.5G-limited transport category airplane is about 66 degrees. Keep in mind, the available limit load of an airplane often varies with configuration so understand the Critical Bank Angle reduces as your available limit-load reduces. An example of this would be the available positive G limit load in an 2.5G airplane reducing to 2.0G once flaps are selected.

Alright, that's all mildly interesting but does that mean those 66 degree and 73 degree bank angles are the bank angles you're looking for to signal when an unload is required before rolling? Not during an established limit load pull they're not. Why? Well, if the pilot just started rolling (while sustaining a limit load pull) then the inboard wing could exceed limit load by as much as 33%. This is usually compounded by the demonstrated tendency of untrained pilots, who are 'pulling and rolling' out of fear of the ground, to pull even harder than they were pulling prior to initiating the roll. Exceeding the limit load on a wing by more than 50% is a real threat to exceeding the airplane's ultimate load where catastrophic failure protection can no longer be assumed or expected. Given these brief points, it should be evident that rushing to a 'rolling pull' would not be the lowest risk recovery strategy to safely mitigate this situation unless ground impact was an immediate threat as the 'rolling pull' recovery would induce an unjustified asymmetric load on the airplane above it's limit load. As you can see, the pilot must unload, at least to some extent, even when the bank angle is as low as the critical bank angle to keep within the airplane's limit load. So, in response to the original question: 'What minimum bank angle does the pilot need to consider unloading the airplane prior to rolling the lift vector towards wings-level in a spiral dive recovery?' The generalized response based on what we've discussed so far is: 'The minimum bank angle signaling that an unload is likely a prudent primary control input prior to rolling towards level in a spiral dive is typically between 45 degrees and 60 degrees of bank.  This bank angle varies based on the airplane's design limits, the specifics of the situation and the airplane's position on the speed curve in relation to maneuvering speed'.

NOTE TO READER: To this point discussing the 'unload concept' in a spiral dive scenario, we have only addressed some of the limit-load implications whereas there are several other reasons unloading has additional benefits in certain situations. This is one of the those 'certain situations'. Unloading prior to rolling can further enhance the pilot's ability to safely mitigate the lift-vector pointing problem. Without getting into detail here, the additional reasons to unload prior to rolling revolve around roll rate optimization and associated influences on resulting dive angle during the recovery. Unfortunately, a thorough discussion on those topics would extend this already long winded reply.

Please have a look at the brief Spiral Dive discussion video to the right presented by Clarke 'Otter' McNeace, the APS Director of Flight Training & Standards. As we leave the topic, it is important to keep in mind that the primary goal in a spiral dive recovery (or any upset recovery) is not to just minimize altitude loss at all costs unless ground impact is an immediate threat. Unfortunately, many instructors assume 'ground impact is always an immediate threat' in ALL potential loss of control situations, not just spiral dives, as that seems to be safest assumption. Tragically, this seemingly justified assumption can lead instructors and pilots astray if they don't participate in comprehensive upset prevention and recovery training where a spectrum of relevant considerations are integrated. Minimizing altitude is only one of several factors that determine a low risk, effective and executable recovery strategy in a loss of control in-flight crisis. Moreover, 'minimizing altitude loss' is rarely the top priority in a loss of control in-flight situation and tends to forever remain secondary to regaining and maintaining control of the airplane.

Sidebar: The historic focus of stall recovery (from ab initio flight training through to transport category type rating and recurrency training) has repeatedly emphasized minimizing altitude loss. As is the case for loss of control in-flight for commercial pilots, general aviation pilots need to understand that GA Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) is the leading cause of fatalities for them as well (see chart to right). Nearly half of those fatal accidents begin with the aerodynamic stall. Thanks to the major manufacturers responding to the fatal consequences of mis-prioritizing altitude loss as 'the' most important consideration in a stall during training, stall recovery techniques and strategies are being upgraded throughout the aviation industry to give primary focus to regaining and maintaining aircraft control. If that seems like it should be obvious, it is not obvious to a pilot startled in an upset or stall event. Sadly, there are many fatal accidents (including very recent ones) where mis-prioritization of minimizing altitude loss as been identified as negative training. This is often characterized by the accident pilot(s) instinctively pulling back on the control column in a stall (and keeping it back) despite a litany of aerodynamic cues, stall warning cues and negative stability handling characteristics clearly identifying the situation as a stall ... the stall must be fixed by reducing angle of attack irrespective of altitude, airspeed or flight attitude. Re-enter the 'push' or 'unload' concept once again ...

SUMMARY: The last point I'd like to bring forward is encouragement for readers to consider participating in our online academic video training (click the Red Cross at the top of any of the website's pages). This training is suited to pilots of all skill levels and takes much of the academic mystery out of the loss of control in-flight threat to pilots. One thing we've learned over the years from the 1000s of pilots we've trained is that loss of control questions can be quite diverse and responses often perceived as overwhelmingly complicated as one could conclude from just the beginnings of the brief explanation I've offered above. The power of being actively involved in a fully comprehensive upset prevention and recovery training program such as is offered by APS is to render a large amount of the complexities of loss of control in-flight, and its seemingly endless variations, into a compartmentalized series of strategies that can be applied effectively, simply and comprehensively. Most importantly, these strategies can be applied consistently even in a high-stress, time-critical startle situation characteristic of the majority of real world airplane upsets whether those upsets be pilot-induced, environmentally-induced or system-anomaly induced.

Kriegler, I hope this answered at least a portion of your question even though I made a few assumptions to keep the response brief. All aspects of spiral dive situations (and a wide diversity of even more complex scenarios) are fully addressed during APS on-site practical training and throughout our on-line training services.

Sincerely,

Paul BJ Ransbury
APS Emergency Maneuver Training - President
UPRTA.org - Vice President, Global Integration
ICATEE.org - Co-Leader, Upset Training Analysis Development Team

• Under Mr. Ransbury's direct management and supervision of both US-based and foreign academies, more than 4,000 professional jet pilots have been successfully trained in standardized upset prevention & recovery training techniques and mitigation strategies
• Former F/A-18 Hornet Fighter Pilot and Instructor
• Former Airbus A320 Airline Pilot
• Gold Seal Flight Instructor / Master CFI - Aerobatic
  CFI / CFII / MEI / AGI

Original Posting at: Why Upset Recovery Training Makes You a Better Pilot

The following accident analysis information was presented in the June 2011 Issue of Sport Aviation magazine ...

10-Years of Accidents and Causal Factors

THE GENERAL AVIATION JOINT STEERING COMMITTEE (GAJSC) and Safety Analysis Team (SAT) continues to focus on data-driven risks and solutions. To begin that process, the fatal GA accident range of 2001—2010 was selected for analysis, resulting in 2,472 total events. Accidents were categorized using the common codes such as loss of control—in-flight (LOC—I), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), system/component failure—powerplant (SCF—PP), etc. Additionally, the type of aircraft was also categorized, using homebuilt, turbine, and reciprocating non-homebuilt, resulting in the chart seen here.

Loss of control (LOC) was identified far and away as the most prevalent type of fatal GA accident with 1,190 fatal accidents followed by controlled flight into terrain, with 432. A risk reduction working group has been formed that will study LOC accidents, beginning with those occurring during the approach and landing phase of flight, determine contributing factors, and develop intervention strategies. EAA staff is actively participating in the GAJSC, SAT, and a newly established working group in our continuing efforts to reduce the fatal accident rate.

Sport Aviation, June 2011 (www.eaa.org), Page 9

Excerpt from AF447 Update Report:

"The airplane’s angle of attack increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs. The vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, dropped to 700 ft/min and the roll varied between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The speed displayed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees ... "

For official information, download the 27 May 2011 update report titled ACCIDENT TO THE AIRBUS A330-203 FLIGHT AF 447 ON 1ST JUNE 2009

NEW FINDINGS

At this stage of the investigation, as an addition to the BEA interim reports of 2 July and 17 December 2009, the following new facts have been established:

• The composition of the crew was in accordance with the operator’s procedures.
• At the time of the event, the weight and balance of the airplane were within the operational limits.
• At the time of the event, the two co-pilots were seated in the cockpit and the Captain was resting. The latter returned to the cockpit about 1 min 30 after the disengagement of the autopilot.
• There was an inconsistency between the speeds displayed on the left side and the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS). This lasted for less than one minute.
• After the autopilot disengagement:
  • the airplane climbed to 38,000 ft,
  • the stall warning was triggered and the airplane stalled,
  • the inputs made by the PF were mainly nose-up,
  • the descent lasted 3 min 30, during which the airplane remained stalled. The angle of attack increased and remained above 35 degrees,
  • the engines were operating and always responded to crew commands.
  • The last recorded values were a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, a roll angle of 5.3 degrees left and a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.

CAE and APS collaborate to offer Advanced Jet Upset Recovery e-Learning course based on FAA recommendations

Atlanta, Georgia  –  (NYSE: CAE; TSX: CAE) – CAE and APS Emergency Maneuver Training announced on the eve of the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) annual convention, the availability of an online computer-based training course designed to improve the ability of business jet pilots to recognize, avoid and, if necessary, recover from loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) flight situations.

The CAE-APS e-Learning course is based on U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recommendations contained in the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid (AURTA), Revision 2. The Air Line Pilots Association's (ALPA) Human Factors and Training Group and the ALPA Training Council announced recently its support for "enhanced academic requirements … on approach to stall, impending stall, full stall and abnormal flight conditions," including utilization of the AURTA "as a validated and appropriate guide for upset recovery training."

"Aircraft upset is not a common occurrence and the overwhelming majority of flights proceed without incident thanks to modern aircraft technology and training," said Lou Nemeth, CAE's Chief Safety Officer. "However, according to recent studies, loss of control in-flight remains a leading cause of accidents and incidents, and it is essential that professional pilots understand the aerodynamic principles and recommended recovery techniques that are similar for all large, swept-wing jet airplanes."

LOC-I is defined as flight that occurs outside of the normal flight envelope with an inability of the pilot to control the aircraft. The CAE-APS e-Learning course uses real-world example animations, video, graphic diagrams and other techniques to address topics such as causes of airplane upsets (including environmentally induced upsets, systems anomaly-induced upsets, and pilot-induced upsets), swept-wing aerodynamics, control surface fundamentals, high-altitude operations, recovery from airplane upsets, and upset recovery techniques for stall, nose-high, nose-low and high-bank angles. The course is available at www.caelearning.com/aviation-pilot-courses.aspx.

"With a few dedicated hours of online study, pilots can gain potentially life-saving academic knowledge crucial to understanding unusual flight attitudes, prevention strategies and fundamental all-altitude recovery skills," said Paul BJ Ransbury, President of APS Emergency Maneuver Training and a former airline and military fighter pilot. "Pilots who understand the conditions of an upset will be better prepared to make time-critical decisions to prevent, or immediately recover from, an airplane upset safely."

In addition to threshold knowledge in upset recovery principles, the CAE-APS e-Learning course can help prepare professional pilots for scenario-based training in a full-flight simulator and real aircraft training in safe, aerobatic aircraft.

About CAE

CAE is a world leader in providing simulation and modelling technologies and integrated training solutions for the civil aviation industry and defence forces around the globe. With annual revenues exceeding C$1.5 billion, CAE employs more than 7,500 people at more than 100 sites and training locations in more than 20 countries. We have the largest installed base of civil and military full-flight simulators and training devices. Through our global network of 29 civil aviation and military training centres, we train more than 75,000 crewmembers yearly. We also offer modelling and simulation software to various market segments, and through CAE's professional services division we assist customers with a wide range of simulation-based needs.

About APS Emergency Maneuver Training

APS Emergency Maneuver Training at Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport (Mesa, Arizona) has trained thousands of pilots in fully comprehensive upset recovery skill development, more than any other training organization. For 15 years, APS has been committed to giving professional pilots and private pilots of all skill levels the highest quality upset recovery training available. We offer comprehensive LOC-I solutions via industry-leading web-based, on-aircraft, and full-flight simulator upset recovery training programs. APS is the only Part 141 Flight School currently certified in the delivery of upset recovery, stall / spin and instrument recovery training courses worldwide. All APS upset recovery training courses are in compliance with the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid.

Overview

There are a number of research needs and deficiencies in training methodologies for upset/stall prevention and recovery training protocols. In an effort to address these gaps we offer the following outline. This high level framework and general sequence of training phases has been practically verified to yield consistent results in enhanced upset/stall prevention and recovery training (UPRT). The verified program delivery outlined below integrates on-line computer-based training, instructor-led training, on-aircraft platforms and level D full flight simulators. Despite the content, sequence, methodologies and specialty topics delivered by a training organization, the success of any training program is directly related to the individual instructor’s ability to present a building block approach appropriate to, and tailored to, the individual pilot-in-training. UPRT is often an individualized training process due to both its inherent complexities and the widely varying experience levels of commercial pilots. The extent, depth and duration of the training program can vary significantly as a function of the baseline knowledge and skill of both the Instructor Pilot and trainee involved in the training process.

Academic Preparation

Gaps in the academics associated with Upset Prevention and Recovery Training can be reduced by ensuring academic preparation establishes the foundation from which situational awareness, insight, knowledge and, eventually, skills will be developed. As in practical skill development, academic preparation should move from general to specific while clearly emphasizing the importance of basic concepts during each education phase. Although academic preparation is crucial and does offer a level of mitigation of the Loss-of-Control In-Flight (LOC-I) threat, the long-term retention of pertinent academic knowledge is best achieved when applied and correlated during practical hands-on awareness, prevention and recovery exercises.

Practical Skill Development

The development of practical skills can follow a variety of valid training paths. Prior research has investigated a variety of training tools that can be used for skill training. Regardless of the tool being employed, every effort should be made by the training organization to ensure academic preparation is presented in relevance-based portions prior to each practical training session to enhance student retention and comprehension. Alternatively, academic preparation could precede the practical course entirely.

Awareness Training

The enhanced stall and airplane upset environment is often unfamiliar to pilots-in-training. In support of the building block approach of paired academic and practical skill development packaging, a significant portion of concept and strategy awareness training can be best addressed during the initial training sessions. Elements of awareness development have a variety of applications within both the prevention and recovery training phases. Through focus on the individual awareness elements of AOA, load, lift vector and energy management (and consequences of mismanagement) early in the UPRT training program, the pilot-in-training is afforded an opportunity to gain trust and confidence in the training platform, instructor pilot and construction of the program itself. It is crucial for fundamental concepts to be introduced in a non-threatening manner to enhance the pilot in training’s situational awareness at a rate that can be internalized. Inappropriately subjecting a pilot in training to dramatic events beyond their ability to resolve correctly can have severe long-term negative consequences associated with their trust, overall maximum skill level, and ability to contain fear and stress-induced over-response in later portions of the training program. Re-enforcing learning through positive experiences early in the training regime significantly impacts the pilot-in-training’s overall capability to expand practical knowledge and skill in a short period of time.

Prevention Training: Recognition & Avoidance

As previously stated, the primary focus of all enhanced stall and upset recovery training programs and methodologies must be firmly and squarely placed on prevention through enhanced awareness. There are two general types of prevention training. One type is time-favorable and the other type is time-critical. Although thorough UPRT should address both, the latter time-critical component is often the most difficult to address for a variety of psycho/physiological reasons.

Prevention through Aeronautical Decision Making: Time Favorable

This element of prevention revolves around the concept of effective aeronautical decision making (ADM) through analysis, awareness, resource management and intercepting the error chain through airmanship and sound judgment. Typically on the time scale of minutes or hours, a common example would be a situation where the pilot assesses the conditions at an airport prior to descent and recognizes those conditions as being too severe to safely subject the airplane to that environment on approach. Although a very simple scenario, the process of using situational awareness to avert a potentially threatening flight condition is an example of prevention through effective ADM. In the preceding example, if the crew elected to continue to the planned destination as the conditions were not too severe to abandon the approach, an effective flight crew would brief their mitigation strategies, apply appropriate counter-measures (utilize weather radar, request updated weather information, apply increased approach speeds, etc.) and identify and narrow their approach targets (i.e. we will initiate a missed approach if we do not hit specific targets on approach). The latter scenario is a more comprehensive demonstration on how effective flight crews use time favorable prevention strategies to enhance loss of control in-flight threat mitigation.

Prevention through Proportional Counter-Response: Time Critical

In simple terms, proportional counter response is the timely manipulation of flight controls and thrust, either singly or in combination, to manage an airplane flight attitude and/or flight envelope excursion that was unintended or not commanded by the pilot. The trained pilot is situationally aware and recognizes the developing threat. The time scale of this element of prevention is typically on the order of seconds or fractions of seconds with its goal being to recognize the development of a threatening condition and take proportional avoidance actions to preclude its development into an airplane upset. Due to the surprising nature of this level of developing upset, there is often a high risk of the pilot panicking and over-reacting to the event with the further risk of making the situation worse, unrecoverable or even generating structural failure in rare instances. The ability of the trained pilot to overcome surprise/startle factor can be significantly enhanced through exposure to similar time-critical events during training in combination with the pilot’s enhanced skill set capable of resolving a flight condition beyond those experienced in day-to-day operations. Note: In fly-by-wire airplanes with active flight envelope protections, this phase of time-critical prevention through proportional counter-response may be accomplished by the pilot allowing the automation to attempt to manage the time-critical disturbance in its entirety (if recommended by the manufacturer).

Recovery Training: Recognition & Recovery

Once an airplane’s flight condition exceeds a certain level of severity, whether unintentional or uncommanded, the pilot must recognize the necessity of intervention and avert disaster through the pro-active application of effective upset recovery techniques. Early prevention through proportional counter-response in a developing airplane upset cannot be over-emphasized in UPRT. However, once the flight condition has transitioned from the prevention phase and into the recovery phase, the pilot must recognize the transition and employ immediate corrective recovery action. Although definitions of an upset can vary, an airplane upset is typically defined as an unintentional flight condition that has deviated beyond established threshold values of pitch, roll, airspeed and/or angle of attack. One major deficiency in many UPRT programs is that the recovery phase of UPRT is often the primary, or exclusive, focus of training. On its own recovery training does offer significant value on a variety of levels, however, the core element of UPRT must again remain focused on prevention. However, the process of recovery training enhances the pilot’s ability to contain startle factor, comprehend the primary all-attitude all-envelope proper use of primary flight controls and to also enhance situational awareness. Similar to the overall concept of a building block approach to UPRT, the recovery phase is best served by following a similar process of awareness and skill development. The general sequence of imparting UPRT skills tends to follow the flow of (a) Primary Control Strategies, (b) Alternate Control Strategies, (c) Ancillary Integration, and (d) Type/Class Specific Considerations.  It must be clear that type-specific considerations can be crucial to the effective implementation of recovery techniques and that the airplane manufacturer’s recommended recovery methods always take precedence. This general building-block sequence addressing the recovery phase of skills training has been shown to impart long lasting skill sets to pilots while maximizing the understanding of prevention and recovery mitigations within the widest range of fixed wing airplane operations. The end result of a comprehensive upset recovery training program is to arm pilots with enhanced awareness and skills that are transferable and effective in their own airplane type.

Containing the Startle/Surprise Factor in Upset Recovery Training

All training programs must include and address startle/surprise factor. Imparting UPRT skill sets to pilots, without addressing startle/surprise factor, will not reliably enable the pilot to effect recovery during the mentally and physically demanding environment of an airplane upset. Although skill development should happen first to maximize the pilot’s ability to integrate startle/surprise factor containment, the academic understanding of, and practical experience with, surprise/startle events are crucial in UPRT. Presently, the required magnitude, quality and relevance of startle/surprise factor, as it relates to UPRT awareness and skill development specifically, cannot be fully accomplished through ground-based simulation exclusively. The reality of the on-aircraft UPRT training process immerses the pilot within an augmented fidelity of the startle/surprise factor dynamic that is unique to the in-flight real-world environment.

Crew Resource Management in Upset Recovery Training

The CRM aspect of Upset Recovery Training is particularly challenging due to the wide spread inconsistency of UPRT training in the commercial aviation industry. Although there is value in one crew member being comprehensively trained in the airplane upset/stall discipline, the presence of an additional crew member in the decision making process, as is the case in the CRM environment, can have dire consequences. Although the fundamental principles of enhancing situation awareness and promoting mutual decision making in the CRM environment is supportable, the timeline is intensely compressed. Given Boeing/NASA research[1] demonstrating the critical window of time necessary to resolve an airplane upset often at less than 10 seconds to initiate correct recovery action, the threat posed by the interference of the untrained crewmember is severe. In general terms, the crew must (a) communicate and confirm the situation, (b) transfer control to the most situationally aware pilot, and (c) work together through standardized interactions to mutually enhance awareness of the flight condition in order to manage stress between crew members and mitigate fear in a life-threatening situation. Due to the counter-intuitive nature of the UPRT environment, the untrained crewmember can be the most unpredictable element of the CRM-dependent airplane upset prevention and/or recovery scenario.

Authors:

Paul BJ Ransbury, President / APS Chief Flight Instructor / MCFI-A
APS Emergency Maneuver Training

Dr. Janeen Kochan, Ph.D., Human Factors Scientist / Designated Pilot Examiner / Instructor Pilot
Aviation Research, Training, and Services, Inc.
Related Paper: Psychological Considerations During High-performance Flight Training

Sincere Thanks and Appreciation for Editorial Review, Conceptual Accuracy Confirmation and Content Analysis:

Bryan Burks, ALPA Training Council Vice Chairman / 737 Captain
Alaska Airlines

Randall Brooks, Senior Director Flight Training / Former Eclipse Upset Recovery Training Program Manager
Opinicus Corporation

Clarke McNeace, Director of Flight Training & Standards / MCFI-A / Assistant Chief Flight Instructor
APS Emergency Maneuver Training

[1] Defining Commercial Transport Loss-of-Control: A Quantitative Approach – Aug 2004

The Crew Resource Management (CRM) aspect of Upset Prevention & Recovery Training (UPRT) is particularly challenging due to the wide spread inconsistency of UPRT in the commercial aviation industry. Although there is value in one crew member being comprehensively trained in the airplane upset/stall discipline, the addition of another crew member in the decision making process can have dire consequences. Although the fundamental principles of enhancing situation awareness and promoting mutual decision making in the CRM environment is supportable with proper on-aircraft and full flight simulator upset recovery integration, the effective time-line in airplane upset CRM is necessarily compressed.

Please Click Play on the Image Below to View this Video

Video Narrated by APS President, Paul BJ Ransbury

All Pilots - Links that Could Save Your Life:

• Online Upset Recovery Training for All Safety Conscious Pilots
• Practical Hands-On Loss of Control In-Flight Training Programs in Arizona USA

CRITICAL WINDOW IN AIRPLANE UPSET EVENTS: Boeing and NASA research¹ revealed the critical window of time necessary to initiate corrective action to resolve an airplane upset is less than 10 seconds. Given the compressed survival time available, the threat posed by the interference of the untrained crew member is severe. In general terms, the crew must communicate & confirm the situation, transfer control to the most situationally aware pilot and work together through standardized call-outs to mutually enhance awareness of the flight condition to manage stress between crew members and mitigate fear in a life-threatening situation. Due to the counter-intuitive nature of the UPRT environment, the untrained crew member can be the most unpredictable element of the CRM-dependent airplane upset prevention and/or recovery scenario. CRM integration in the upset recovery training is crucial in commercial air carrier flight training.

References:
1 Defining Commercial Transport Loss-of-Control: A Quantitative Approach – Aug 2004

By Paul BJ Ransbury
President of APS Emergency Maneuver Training
April 2010

In most aspects of aviation training, transfer of skill is one of the primary driving forces behind the implementation of various training devices, curricula, type conversions and the applicability of utilizing full flight simulator devices as valid skill development resources. For a thorough discussion on Transfer of Skill in Upset Recovery Training visit our Video Training Web Site for APS Members.

As an example, when I participated in my initial Airbus A320 rating in Miami, Florida, the course took about 6 weeks to complete in preparation for my eventual employment as a line pilot with the airline. The course was designed with several assumptions related to my established pilot skill. I already had advanced flight skills based on flying a variety of military aircraft, had an instrument rating, understood jet aircraft operations and had developed significant airmanship skills in my previous flying experience. The airline had certain expectations and a lot of my skills were taken for granted by them to consider me to be a trainable candidate in the allotted period. At the time, once I completed my type-rating course on the A320 and demonstrated proficiency flying that particular aircraft during IOE, the conversion course for the A330 was a 4-day program. That may seem to all be irrelevant to this discussion but the concept of core pilot skill versus type-specific pilot skill in relation to operating any specific aircraft safely will hit the topic of Transfer of Skill Concepts in Upset Recovery Training head-on as we proceed.

Just by reading that brief paragraph above, only hinting at the very basic highlights of how I was trusted to even get training in an Airbus, it is quite easy to see how pilots and training managers become understandably convinced all aspects of aviation training must follow a similar model. In other words, as our flying experience grows in aviation, all our skills must similarly become enhanced. As we get type-rating after type-rating, we start to take many of our basic skills as pilots for granted without realizing how just a small proportion of our flight skills in our day-to-day operations are actually type-specific.

Unfortunately, the story gets bleaker when we consider the reality of a typical pilot’s LOC-I skill. The assumption that pilots already have a safe level of measurable skill in dealing with upset scenarios outside their small flight-envelope/attitude comfort zone, is not supportable by statistics or formal research. In many ways, pilots need to be taught fundamental all-attitude flight skills as the core focus of upset recovery training as they do not have any experience whatsoever to fall back on. Even worse, in threatening upset situations, as pilots quickly become overwhelmed and start panicking on the flight controls, they tend to go with what they know. Typically, the panicking pilot has no idea their 20,000 hours of flight skills and learned flight control instincts are predominantly invalid when dealing with the loss of control in-flight threat beyond certain parameters.

Although pilots in general are excellent students of aviation, they have not been forced to receive the right kind of training to be armed to deal with the loss of control in-flight threat. It isn’t their fault, as they are simply learning what they are expected to learn by the industry. For pilots to be truly prepared to recognize, avoid and (if necessary) recover from life-threatening airplane upset scenarios, we need to start their training from knowledge of the demonstrated fact that they have very little skill at all.

With such a dismal snapshot of pilot competence in relation to loss of control in-flight situations, how can anything be done quickly, inexpensively and in a manner that truly arms pilots with the skills necessary to save the aircraft and the lives of those they are charged to keep safe? Fortunately, with the right kind of finely tuned upset recovery training, a pilot who is incompetent to deal with a wide variety of LOC-I threats, can be given knowledge, insight skills, and stress-managing strategies that can propel them to a high state of competence in just a few days. And the most exciting part is that the skills learned are enduring, and are skills that last if – again, ‘if’ – the training is done properly.

Why is Upset Recovery Training Such a Unique Challenge?

Although this document addresses the current training industry’s lack of resources to impart all-attitude recovery skills in the typical pilot, it is important to highlight that many aspects of upset recovery training can be accomplished in a traditional manner. As we’ll see a little later, loss of control academic training, type-specific transfer of skill training and some aspects of recognition and avoidance training are well within reach of the established training model.

OK, NOW THIS IS IT FOLKS: It is now time to say what nobody wants to say or hear (especially line pilots, flight schools and many other training institutions) :

The vast majority of skills that can be transferred are already being transferred. The problem is the skills that need to be transferred cannot be transferred because pilots do not have them to begin with. The primary issue in the industry’s task to produce pilots with skills necessary to address loss of control in flight is to give them the skills that they don’t have. When it comes right down to it, “Transfer of Skill” is the easy part as long as the “Core Skills” are taught properly, generically and simply.

It is our contention that more than 90% of the Transfer of Skill issue associated with upset recovery training is actually “Core Upset Recovery Skill Creation” not specifically the “Transferring of Skill”.

Recovering most any type, class or category of fixed wing aircraft from most airplane upsets involves straightforward manipulation of primary flight controls in a manner and order that maximizes the pilot’s ability to resolve the situation to recovery. Technically, the process of applying the core recovery strategy is not difficult. On the other hand, the skills required to do so are counter-intuitive to the pilot who has virtually no all-attitude flight experience of any kind. It is not a complex issue when we’re just talking about identifying the steps necessary for a pilot to recognize, avoid and, if necessary, recover an airplane from an upset. There is more to it than that.

On the down side, there is seemingly an endless supply of tips, tricks or try-this methods that float around the industry, often relayed from flight deck to flight deck, dozens - even hundreds - of times separated from the original sources that allude to recovery techniques which are quite frankly scary and too often unfounded. In some slightly more encouraging cases, the “tips” might actually work in an aerobatic aircraft but often provide no consistent application to safely recovering a non-aerobatic airframe with an untrained pilot at the controls.

A Core Upset Recovery Skill Set of Primary Control Strategies must be established as a fundamental recovery technique for all pilots, or as a minimum, commercial pilots and flight instructors. Defining the elements, application and processes that comprehend a thoroughly demonstrated and universally transferable upset recovery skill set are not the focus of this document. For further information on a thoroughly investigated, tested and practically proven Core Upset Recovery Strategy, please contact APS.

Aspirations with Future Training Developments

Transfer of Skill is a crucial factor in the development of an industry solution to the LOC-I threat. It is hoped academic, political and aviation training efforts made by APS Emergency Maneuver Training will motivate regulators, decision-makers and oversight committees to consider the following in relation to upset recovery training:

1. Transfer of Skill is primarily about Core Skill Development, as pilots do not have a competent skill set pre-established.
2. Over 90% of the core skill development necessary for a pilot to recover an airplane from an in-flight upset is not type-specific. However, type-specific ‘differences training’ in Level D full flight simulator of a pilot’s specific aircraft type would have significant value.
3. Pilots must receive specialized training to be given the fundamental tools to be able to recover any fixed-wing aircraft from a wide variety of stalled flight, unusual attitudes, upsets, control failures and wake turbulence situations. Similar to an Instrument Rating, the core concepts of how to recover a fixed wing aircraft remain relatively constant.
4. Pilots must be given more than just practical skills to deal with a wide variety of airplane upsets. They must be instilled with the mental discipline to not be overwhelmed by the threatening nature of an airplane upset, be able to contain panicked over-response (i.e. contain the startle factor) and have a trained ability to draw upon counter-intuitive skills in a high-stress life-threatening environment.
5. Making a measurable difference in a pilot’s ability to address LOC-I requires a specialized combination of the right kind of academics, threat assessment, decision-making, and skill development through repetition to proficiency and recurrent training. Making a minor change to how training is currently accomplished, although likely keeping regulators and training organizations comfortable will have minor results. Regulated intervention is required.
6. Change will need to be mandated by the regulators and insurance agencies. Airlines, training departments and individual pilots will not use their own initiative to take skill-altering steps to address LOC-I.
7. LOC-I has been appropriately noticed but, for the most part, dismissed since the beginning of aviation history and will continue to be ignored as it has been accepted that an easy solution does not exist. A solution does exist and only requires a few days of specialized training. Similar to the few hours of training mandated to receive high performance, tailwheel, complex aircraft and high altitude endorsements, a regimented requirement for all commercial pilots to have an upset recovery endorsement could potentially be aviation’s largest leap forward in history related to the improvement of safety of flight.

* END *

Press Release Contact Faye Hamilton USA: 1-480-279-1881 faye.hamilton@apstraining.com

Online Upset Recovery Training for Pilots of All Skill Levels Developed by Aviation's Leading Provider of Loss of Control In-Flight Instruction

READ THE PRWEB VERSION OF THIS RELEASE

Mesa, AZ – Aviation Performance Solutions, LLC (APS) announces the release of its online upset recovery training academic program previously only available to pilots participating in-person at the APS Emergency Maneuver Training campus at the Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport in Arizona USA. Over a decade in development, this 'pilot skills training enhancement course' will further support the APS commitment to providing pilots of all experience levels the knowledge necessary to be academically prepared to address aviation's most lethal threat, loss of control in-flight.

“One of the biggest challenges associated with addressing loss-of-control in-flight pilot training, often referred to as upset recovery training, is educating pilots that their regulatory-compliant licensing training only comprehends just over 10 % of the actual flight envelope they fly in every flight.” says Paul BJ Ransbury, President of APS Emergency Maneuver Training. “We witness on a daily basis the disbelief pilots experience, as well as the despair they feel, when they realize first-hand that not only do they not have training useful in nearly 90% of the full flight envelope of their aircraft, the skills they do have are often setting them up to do exactly the wrong thing in an airplane upset necessitating their intervention to recover. Very often pilots graduating from our courses testify they now know they would have never survived an actual airplane upset without having had specialized upset recovery training as offered by APS. Our recently released online course Preparing for Practical Upset Recovery Training lays the foundation of academic preparation for on-aircraft training but also educates pilots on their own deficiencies that they themselves must address as regulatory certification training does not currently provide these crucial survival skills”.

Is Loss of Control In-Flight really that big of a deal or just a new piece of 'here-today-gone-tomorrow' drama for the aviation training industry to let pass with time? Yes, it is a big deal and no, it won't just 'go away'. In fact, over the past 50 years of statistically analyzed accident history in commercial aviation, Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) is indisputably one of the most persistent leading causes of airplane crashes and crash-related fatalities worldwide. Regrettably, current pilot training curricula, standards and certification requirements perpetuate this pilot-skill deficiency. In a report issued by Boeing in July 2009, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s statistical research clearly shows LOC-I representing the most severe cause factor in commercial aviation over the past 10 years, resulting in the most crash-related fatalities from 1999 through 2008. Commercial aviation will continue to experience high rates of LOC-I fatalities until a training solution to mitigate this threat is implemented. This inexpensive online training course is the place to start for pilots at all stages of flight experience. Today’s aviation training marketplace does not currently offer a tangible solution to dealing with Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) using readily available assets, technologies and knowledge resources. This is primarily due to the perceived risk of thorough upset recovery training, the limited accuracy of simulator fidelity in extreme flight conditions, and the stark absence of instructor knowledge to effectively teach all-attitude all-envelope recovery procedures.

More Details on this Online Upset Recovery Training Course

http://www.apstraining.com/upset-recovery-training/life-saving-pilot-training/

About APS Emergency Maneuver Training

APS Emergency Maneuver Training has trained more pilots in fully comprehensive upset recovery training skill development than any other training organization. For the past 14 years, APS has been committed to giving both private and professional pilots the highest quality, most cost-effective upset recovery training available. APS has a diversity of turnkey solutions to mitigate the Loss of Control In-Flight threat from online computer-based training solutions to a fully integrated full motion simulator curriculum complimented by real on-aircraft training. Every APS instructor pilot’s professional flight experience spans a highly specialized spectrum of aviation uniquely qualifying them as ideal LOCI-I training providers. All APS instructors have extensive experience in; all-attitude all-envelope maneuvering in both piston and jet aircraft, military instruction, technologically advanced aircraft and transport category flight operations. In addition to all APS training being in compliance with the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid – Revision 2, APS Emergency Maneuver Training is the only Part 141 Flight School certified in the delivery of upset recovery, spin and instrument recovery training courses worldwide.

For media inquiries, photos and flight information, visit: www.apstraining.com or contact the APS Public Relations Manager, Faye Hamilton, toll free at 1-866-359-4273 or via email at faye.hamilton@apstraining.com.

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Images for Media Use: Courtesy of APS Emergency Maneuver Training

by Jonathan E. Doolittle, President
Sutton James Incorporated
Aviation Insurance Brokers

Download Aviation Consumer Article: APS's Upset Training: Practical Survival Skills

In a 2007 study going back over 50 years, a Boeing safety group identified in-flight loss of control as the number one source of airline fatalities. The 2008 Nall Report tells a similar story for general aviation airplanes.

Loss of control- in flight, or LOC-I in the argot of those who study aircraft accidents, includes a host of hazards ranging from garden-variety stalls to control surface hardovers and encounters with wake turbulence.  LOC- I accidents happen to the spectrum of civilian pilots, from Students to airline veterans, and every one of the rest of us in between.

The stubbornness of LOC-I as the single largest cause of fatal accidents has a great deal to do with the way that we train.  While the airlines have incorporated a number of  loss of control scenarios in their training, general aviation has not really addressed the issue.

The quality of GA training varies widely, and most pilots have never been in a spin unless they trained to be flight instructors or took aerobatic lessons.  Most stall training is aimed at avoidance, rather than recovery.  We go to the horn, or if we’re really feeling brave, to the buffet, and then fly the airplane out.  We rarely completely stall the airplane, especially in crossed-control or other aggravated configurations.  So is it any wonder that when we are confronted with a sudden loss of control of the airplane, we don’t typically react well enough to live through the event?

Enter APS Emergency Maneuver Training, whose motto is ‘to fly another day.’  APS is located in Mesa, Arizona, and is one of a handful of schools around the country that offers upset training to pilots of all backgrounds.  APS is one of the few that is 141 approved, and that is dedicated to this type of training.  We recently completed the APS Professional Pilot Upset Recovery Training Course, which included the core upset recovery program, spin training and instrument recovery training.  While there are a number of schools that offer this type of training, we feel that APS offers an excellent value based upon the qualifications of the instructors, the quality of the curriculum, and the suitability of the airplane used.

All of the APS instructors are former or current military instructor pilots, and a  number have airline experience as well.  We flew with the company’s president, Paul “BJ” Ransbury, and the Director of Flight Training, Clarke “Otter” McNeace.  Both flew F/A-18’s, both have thousands of hours in the Extra 300, and both have strong academic backgrounds for the material they are teaching. Before each flight, they conducted a thorough briefing on the flight.  There was a great deal of stress on making sure that we understood the physics of the upset as well as the recovery.  There was also repeated emphasis on the steps of the recovery procedure.  After each flight, students are debriefed.  We found that the debriefings were excellent reinforcement.  The instructors seemed to have almost total recall of the specifics of the flight.  The airplanes are also equipped with video cameras mounted on the right wing, vertical stab and inside the cockpit.  Particularly after the spin flights, video was used for the debriefings along with the instructors comments.  Each student goes home with cd’s of all of the flying that he did during the course.

We found the curriculum to be a good balance of academics and a rote building block approach to use in the airplane.  We were furnished with the course manuals months before arriving and were urged to read them and re-read them before starting the course.  We found that this helped speed up our learning substantially.  Everything that we were taught in the classroom sessions was carefully related to what we would see and do in the airplane, but there was a considerable underpinning of aerodynamics.  None of this is rocket science, but we came away with a much better understanding of the fundamental importance of angle of attack, as well as the effects of g-loading, roll-yaw coupling, negative roll damping.

In addition to the academic side of things, APS provides a building block approach which they call the ‘All Attitude Upset Recovery Checklist,’ a five step procedure which allowed us to proceed one step at a time from total chaos to recovery of the airplane to an upright attitude.   As the name implies, this technique is used for almost every situation except for fully-developed spins.  For spins, APS uses the NASA spin-recovery technique.

One of the most important parts of the training was the ‘say and do’ technique, which forces the student to name each step of the recovery process as he does it.  We found that if we could say it, we could eventually do it as well.  By the end of the course, the combination of increased understanding and repeated practice with the techniques made us feel that we probably would have the chance ‘to fly another day.’

For upset and spin training, APS relies upon two Extra 300L’s, complete with shark’s teeth.  While the point of the training is to learn to recover within the limits of Standard or Transport category airplanes, the Extra’s unlimited aerobatic capability and limit load of plus or minus 10 g’s make it an ideal airplane for this type of training.  There is no maneuver that can’t be recovered from, and your internal organs will probably fail before the airplane does.  The huge margin between the g’s that you pull in the course and the g-load available to the airplane made us feel very comfortable.  And if you haven’t flown an Extra before, you are in for a treat.  Aside from the light stick forces which took us about 15 minutes to get used to, there are few surprises.  It goes where you point it, and does what you think it will.  If you have never flown with a stick before, you will find the transition painless.

APS has a military feel to it, and it is noticeable throughout  the course.  The instructors and some of the students wear flight suits.  Most flights start as a formation flight of two airplanes out to the practice area, then break up into north and south working areas, and at the end of the lesson, rejoin for the brief flight back to the airport.  If you are interested in trying your hand at formation flying, this is a good time for it.  Missions, as APS refers to them , are  crafted so that there is no time wasted, and yet we never felt that it was a problem if we wanted to see a given maneuver yet another time.  And if we didn’t do it correctly, the instructor’s would point out our errors, and we would keep doing it until we had it right.

There were a number of maneuvers put into the syllabus as demonstrations, and we thought that these were well chosen and great teaching tools.  Our personal favorite was the zoom maneuver, which basically consists of pulling the nose up to about 30 degrees, and then pushing till you are light in the seat, about ½ G.  The airplane flew a gentle arcing parabola, and as airspeed dropped, we were encouraged to move the controls in order to see that when unloaded, the controls remained effective 20 knots below the published 1-g stall speed.  This was an excellent graphic reminder of the effects of g-loading on angle of attack and hence upon stall speeds.

The greatest benefit of the course is that the student, accompanied by an extremely experienced instructor in a very capable airplane is able to safely explore areas of the envelope well beyond what he will see in normal operations, or what he could live through if he saw it by himself for the first time.  The skidding turn stall is performed by starting a turn, and then feeding in increasing amounts of inside rudder while gradually adding aileron against overbank and back pressure in an attempt to keep the nose from falling.  When the stall comes, it is spectacular, and it happens at a speed well above the published stall speed, rolling the airplane onto its back quite briskly, and leaving you looking down at rocks and desert, no blue sky, the proverbial ‘face full of dirt.’  Using the all-attitude upset recovery technique, the student goes from step to step, fixing the upset by saying and making one control input at a time.  Another unusual attitude covered in the course is the spiral dive.  When our instructor gave us the controls, the airspeed was almost 200 knots, and the g-load was about 3.8, well beyond what you would want to do intentionally in your own airplane, but not so different from what might happen in the real situation.

We liked the businesslike approach that the instructors took toward the training.  They carefully briefed the flight, and then flew the mission as briefed.  In case we missed anything, we then sat down and debriefed.  We felt that there was a good balance of academics and the rote learning that must be at the heart of any emergency procedure where the pilot is not likely to be thinking clearly.  We liked the airplane.  While the point of the course was to learn how to recover the kind of airplane that you actually fly day in and day out, it was nice to know that if you screwed up a maneuver or a recovery, you wouldn’t hurt the airplane.

We think that the experience we gained during the course is invaluable.  Our sense is that in order to remain proficient in the recovery procedures, we would have to return every two years or so.

The APS courses are not cheap.  The 2-day, 3 flight Basic Upset Recovery course lists on the website for $2,415.  The Standard Emergency Maneuver Training course lasts 3 days and includes 5 flights,  and lists for $3,290.  APS also offers training in formation flying, aerobatics, and simulator training as well.

We felt that given the experience of the instructors, the curriculum and the airplane, that the price of the courses we took was an excellent value.  We would recommend this school to any pilot who is interested in learning more about upset recovery. We will certainly be back next year.